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In

The Supreme Court
of the
State of Utah
HYDE PAR.K TO'\~X,
a Municipal Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

G-EORGE CHA~fBERS AND
1, .A C Y CHAMBERS, His
Wife, E. S. CHAMBERS, a
Single· Man, BERTHA POULSEN, as Guardian of ADELL
IDA POULSEN, a Minor,
DAVID J. WEEKS, and
}fARY WEEKS, His Wife,
Defendants and Respondent~.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The appellant is a Municipal Corporation organized under and exi·sting by virtue of the laws
of the State of Utah, and situated in Cache County,
Utah.
About the year 1911, the appellant, being with;out a municipal water system, •entered into an oral
eontract with the Smithfield Irrigation Company.
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By means of this contract, the right to use water
from a certain spring in Birch Creek Canyon was
granted by Smithfield Irrigation Company, a mutual irrigation company. The Town constructed a
:Pipe - line to convey the water from this spring
in Birch Creek Canyon in a general south or southwesterly direction to a reservoir situated at a
slightly higher elevation than the Town.
The pipe-line thus constructed w.as made of
clay tile pipe, .and wa:s a gravity line. For thi~
reason, it was necess.ary to follow the contour of
the uneven surface of the lands over 'vhich it
passed. The lands of the· respondent·s were crossed
hy this pipe-line in the course of its route to the
l"eservoir. It was necessary for the Town to acquire a right of way .across each of these lands, and
in consideration of the grant of this right of wa.y
the Town orally granted each of said re·spondents
a tap on their respective lands. These taps, conn0cted with the water system of the appellant,
flowed a constant dripping -stream and this stream
was used by the resp·ective land owners for culinary
purposes and for stock-watering purposes. None
of the r~spondents ever resided on his lands at any
time after said taps were installed, so that by
''culinary uses'' it is meant only that the \Vater
was used for drinking purpose·s while the men were
working on their lands. The oral agreement did
not mention a.nv time limit nor 'vas there any discus~ion of any ~ther consideration for the· granting
(of these tap·s, except only the. grant of the right of
way.

The lands of the respondents are userl principally for pasturage, although possibly a little of
the land is farmed. It is largely mountainoug
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or side-hill land. There is no eYidence tending to
show the numb~r of animals grazed on the Chainhers' land, and there is little or no evidence to show
the number grazed from year to year on the 'Veeks'
Jand. The latter did, ho,veYer, te·stify that during
the year 1939 he kept some 25 or 26 animals there ;
but no proof -was introduced as to "~hether or not
this was the number which he ha.d ordinarily kept
there.
\\ithin a year or two after the original pipe·line was eonstructed, the springs proved inadequate
and the pipe-line was then extended a short distance up Birch Creek Canyon, in an attempt to tap
another small spring area; both springs being
used. Some years later, this was repeated and the
Town tapped a third spring, using all three. About
1916, the line wa:s extended further up Birch. Creek
Canyon and an additional spring tapped; all of the
spring areas being used by the Town~
Notwithstanding these additional sources, the
water supply proved very inadequate and along
about the year 1935, a large spring ·situated several
miles up Birch Creek Canyon, was tapped. At
that time appellant entered into a new contract with
Smithfield Irrigation Company, thus securing the
waters it now uses in the amount of one-half c. f. s.
(Amended Answer, Ab. 19; Finding of Fact No.
15, Ab. 87-88).
During all this period of time, the re·spondents
used their taps. They paid no rentals of anv kind
'to the Town. Shortlv after this. the Town decided
tl1at jt was npcessar~ to re-plac~ the old pipe-line
with a new pipe-lin~. for the rea~on that the old
ripe-line leaked and wa'R very wasteful. This new
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pipe-line was constructed in the same general route
as the old line, but being a pressure pipe, it no
longer followed the contours of the land, but :went
in a nearly straight course. Thus in the lands be·
longing to the respondents, pa,rt of the time it followed the same course, but often left it, cutting out
curves .and bends .
About the year 1887, the respondents ~Veeks,
homesteaded the lands belonging to him, and about
that time he built a house on the lands. He con;.;;tructed a ditch called the Lower Ditch, which had
its source in the same springs as the originan source
of the town's pipe-line. This ditch conducted water
to the lower end of his land. He lived on the land
while he was required to) do s'o for hom·e·ste.ad purpo·ses, then he left the place and moved to Smithfield and has never resided there since. This was
about the year 1896. Shortly before he left his
land, he constructed what was known:·as the Upper
Ditch. This ditch had its source in Birch Canyon,
som.e 160 rods above the Hyde Park intake. It conducted water for ·stock-watering and irrigation purposes to the lands~.helonginig to~ the respondents, and
this water wa·s used by each of the respondents in
connection with others. It was what is known a.s a
High-Water right, and as soon as the stream in
Birch Canyon receded from it~ ·sprin~ flow, no more
'va.te·r \vas permitted to run through this ditch for
irrigation purposes; but it is claimed that a small
amount passed through the- ditch and wa.s used for
Rtoek-watering purposes, etc., during the greater
part of the season.
The respondents never used the lower ditch
:after the upp~er ditch was con·stn1cted. 'The upper
'ditch is still in use for irrigation purposes, but of
course, it is still a High-W.ater right and no water
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flows in it after the High_:"\Yater st:ason ends. Respondents testified that as soon u~ they got the tap
·water, they found that it was superior 'to the culinary ,vater w·hich they had previously conducted
through the upper ditch and they, therefore, abandoned their culinary stream. They do not claim
that this abandonment was induced by the Town of
Hyde Park, or any of its official8, but \Yas due
soJely to the fact that they preferred the tap water.
Respondents 'Seemed to take the position that because of their abandonment of the culinary stream
conducted through the upper ditch, they cannot be
placed in status quo if the Town refuses to supply
them longer with tap water. This abandonment
wa:s voluntary on their part, and not induced by
appellant.
Mter the construction of the new pipe-line, the
Town permittEd its old pipe-line to remain in place
and ofier('d to give this pipe-line to the\ respondents
if they wished to accept it. The dripping stream
in each of the taps in question passed through a
-small hole in a cap screwed to the end of a hlaf-inch
pipe and some controversy grew up between th~
appellant and respondents, due to the claim of the
appellant that the respondents greatly enlarged th('
holes in the caps and at times r~moved the caps er-tirely, thus causing much more water to flow through
the taps than originally contemplated. Respond.ents claim that these acts, if done at all, were not
done by them, but were done by hunters and other
peoplP coming to the taps for a drink of water.
Be that as it may, some irritation developed~ becausP
of the claim of appellant that the respondents wasted
considerable water.
When the appellant constructed thiR new pinP-line it did not permit r.e . .
~pond{\nts to construct taps in its ne'v line. Some
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\vas so pronounced that at times some of the citizens could not obtain a drink.
ASSIGNMENT 3
Findin.g No. 10 is clearly error. All of the
(:.Vidence including the contracts in evidence, show
that the Town was the ·owner of one-half a cubic
foot per second, instead of one and one-half as
found by the court. This may have been only a
typographical error; but it should be corrected.

ASSIGNMENT 4
Assignment Four is subject to the s.ame obser·
va.tions as we made in our argument on Assignment No. 2.

ASSIGNMENT 5
The Finding No. 13, wherein the court found
that the "defendants and their predeces·sors in in·
terest conveyed a portion of the water of Birch
~re·ek to_the Town of H)llde P'ark for culinarY. purposes'' is totally and entirely unsupported by the
evidence. Mr. Weeks, the only witness te·stifying
~n this matter, said (Ab. 86) that the only thing he
gave the Town was a. right of way. It is true he
said that "after he got the culinary water from
!plaintiff's system, he abandoned the culinary system he had in the upper ditch.'' He did not claim
that the Town of Hyde Park used, or could
11 Sf\ this 'vater so abandoned.
Presumably, it
flo,vPcl down Birch Creek, a live stream, to the
hf\nefit of Smithfield Irrigation Company, the owner
of the stream.
Hyde Park obtained its waters from springs
tr~1 1 ntary to Birch Cr00k, and not. from Birch Creek
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itself; hence, the increase in the size of the stream
in Birch Creek, if it "·ere increased by this abandonment, "rould not benefit Hyde Park, but
would benefit the Irrigation Company. This abandonment "~as not made at the request of Hyde Park
or any of its officers, but was n1ade voluntarily by
the defendants after the right of way W'<l·~ given to
the Town and he had found the advantag·es of using
the water from the pipe-line .
..._-\.SSIGN":MENT 6
We have already called the attention of 'the
Court to the fact that the pleadings -and the evidence show that defendants were not supplied with
water during any part of the year 1939 ; henc.e, this
finding that the plaintiff ha·s supplied the defendants with water ''ever since 1911'' must be error.
ASSIG~""1IENT

7

There is no evidence to support the court's
finding ''that ever since said year 1911 the·se de·fendants have openly, continuously, adversely and
under claim of right, used the said taps and the
water flowing therefrom for the purpose of human
consnmptiojn. and watering their livestock, in an
amount of about 300 gallons per day.''
AU the evidence shows that the u·se by defendants was pennissive and with the· consent of plaintiff, ·and hence the use could not be ·adverse. The
right would depend on contract (if ·there was any
c·ontract) and not on adverse possession. We will
discuss this further, hereinafter. Then, the finding
is not supported, because of another fact. There
is no evioence whatso ver as to the amount used
by d~f~ndants. 'V eeks said he had enough to run
0
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1down a corn row. (Ab. 29). He did not say how
long the corn row was. There was no other quantity testified to. The defendants, and each of. them,
lived in Smithfield and did not live on their !lands.
They say they watered cattle at the taps, and ,drank
the water when they worked on their lands. There
was'no p~roof as to the .number of cattle pastured
by either of the ~defendants, and the amount found
iby the court (300 g1allons)l i·s based on no evidence
whatsoever. There is no evidence whatsoever that
any use is made of the water during the winter
season, yet the court required the taps to run all
year. ;This would ·seem to be a clear case of waste~
In any event, it finds no support in the evidence.
ASSIGNMENT 8
We have previously, under Assignment No. 5.
considered the facts showing that this a:ssignment
is well taken.
ASSIGNMENT 9
It would seem obvious that Finding No. 21 is
a conclusion, rather than a finding of ultimate
facts.
ASSIGmfENT 10

We have called the attention of the Court to
the fact that there rs no evidence that .Plaintiff benefitted fro1n the abandonment by defendants (if they
!did so abandon) of their water rights. Nor were
1__hey abandoned at the request of the plaintiff
Plaintiff then would have no duty to restore defendants to the statns quo The rightf; of plaintiff
I

I
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in this ca-se do not dep~nd on such a restoration.
\\"'" e ·will discuss this hereinafter.

ASSIGNMENT 11
It is clear that this is not a finding of any fact,
but is a conclusion of la"~ drawn by the court from
other facts .
ASSIG~~ENT

12

This assignment can best be considered later in
connection with other assignments.

ASSIGN1IEXTS 13 AND 14
It is- self-evident that no court can determine
the amount of water required to supply defendants'
cattle, without determining how many cattle belonging to defendants, require water. The court failed
to make f any such :findings ; hence, its fin rung that
the defendants are each entitled to 300 gallons per
day for human consumption, and sufficient to water
the livestock of each defendant, is not I?a:sed on
evidence. The defendants do not live on their
lands, and the court did ~at find the number of
cattle to be supplied.
ASSIG~T).IENT

15

This assignment is best considered later, in
connection with others.

ASSIGNMEKTS 16, 17, 18

A~D

19

These assignments are best considered later,
like~se.
The assig11ments not discussed above \vill no\v
b~ discussed together.
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The de·eree ;entered in this case is based on
the general assumption by !the court that the oral
;agreement between plaintiff and defendants, or
their predeeessors in interest, is now' a valid and
·subsisting agreement and perpetual in its duration.
The only testimony on this matter was by Mr.
\Veeks (Ab. 31-32), and Mr. Toolson (Ab. 38) the
predecessor of Chambers. Weeks said he agreed
to give a right of waY' for the tap. No ·statement
'vas made as to duration of the contract. Mr.
\To olson testified to similar facts. The court interpreted this agreement to be1 perpetual. This interpreta.tion is erroneous. The. proner construction
of suchl a contract is that it is terminable at will.
Thus, where a .city agreed to perpetually suptply a land-owner with! w.ater. to operate his toilets,
free of charge, in .exchange: for the right granted to
the city to lay its sewer pipe·s across the landowner's land, it was held that such a contract was
null and void and ultra vires, and could be terminated by the city. This was because: the city had
no power to enter into perpetual contracts. The
ca·se also held that notwithstanding the city still
continued to use the sewer, it ,va.s not estopped
from repudiating the contract.
Horkan v. City of ·Moultrie (Ga.) 71 S. E.

785.
The Court in the above ca~c has0d its ruling on
the fact that it would be nnfnir to let one council
l)inrl future ones in such a "1'a~r that they could not
fix equal unifor1n water rates from time to time.
Thus, also~ a ri o-ht oorPntPcl to a \Vater company
1-o use the streets of BoisP without stating any
limit of time, for the pnrpO'se of constructing water
mains to he USP.d in snpplyin.g the inhabitants of
the rity V\7ith cnUn:-1 ry "'"ater, "ra~ l1Pld to be n mPr·e
1
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license, terminable at will. The Court also held
that the officers 'vere not estopped to set aside a
void agreement.

.

Boise Citv
. v. Boise Etc. Co. 186 Fed 705
Cert. Denied ~20 U.S. 616, Appeal
Dismissed, 230 lT. S. 98.
This ruling was placed upon the ground that a per.
petual contract cannot be granted by a city, and if
attempted to be granted, the contract is terminable
at will.
The city; agreed to levy a tax of five cents on
the dollar perpetually, and pay the money so raised
to a water company in order to obtain a water
supply. This was held void on the ground that such
a perpetual contract was ultra vires and void.
Westminster Water Co. v. Westminster, 98
l\ld. 551; 56 Atl. 990; 64 L.R.A. 630.
~-\_ city and a street railway company entered
into a contract to construct an overhead crO'ssing,
each to pay a portion of the costs. The contract
required the city to keep the crossing in repair perpetually. The law of the State required the railroad company to maintain crossings, and this contract was intended to change this requirement for
the reason th~t the viaduct was much more expen'3ive than \Ya~ necessary for railroad purposes. The
Coul"t he1d that the contract which purported to
pPrpetuallv bind the citv to as·sume the duties of
the railro~d company, w~s ultra vires and void.

State of Minnesota ex rei. St. Paul v. Minnesota, Etc. Co. 80 Minn. 108, 83 N. W.
32 ; 50 L. R . A. 656.

A devise to build n hospital providing that the
rounty would support and maintain the hospital
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perpetually, was he1d invalid for the reason that
the County ~could)) not bind itself perpetually to
support the hospital.
Robbins v. Hoover ·etal. 50 Colo. 610;
115 P. 526.
These ca·ses seem to make it clear that Hyde
Park did not have the power to barter away the
rights of its citizens for .all future time, as co:P.tended for by respondents. And, also, the Court
should construe ·such contracts as subject to being
terminated at will. Clearly, Assignments of Error
Numbers 15 to 20, inclusive, are well taken.
We have already called the attention of the
Court to th;e fact the only consideration for the
grant to the defendants of the right to use. the water
flowing from the tap·s, was the .grant of a right of
way for the pipe-line. This was clearly a "sale"
or ''exchange'' of water rights for a grant of right
of way, and is in violation of the provisions of
our Constitution.
·
Section 6, Article XI, Constitution of Utah
reads a:s follows :
''No municipal corporation shall · directly
or indirectly lease, sell, alien or dispose of
any waterworks, water rights, or sources
of water ·supply now, or hereafter to be
owned or controlled bv it· but all such
"'
'
waterworks, water rights
and
sources of
water supply now owned or hereafter acquired by any municipal corporation, shall
be preserved, maintained and op·erated by
it for supplying its inhabitants with water
at reasonable charges: Provided, that noSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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thing herein contained shall be construed
to preYent any such n1unicipal corporation
from exchanging " ..ater rights, or sources
of w·ater ·supply, for other "·ater rights or
sources of water supply of equal Yalue, and
to be devoted in like manner to the public
supply of its inhabitants.''
No sale of water rights is .ever permitted, and
an exchange can be made only for water rights of
equal value. The plaintiff purchased the only
waters it owns, or has e\er owned, in Birch Canyon
or in any of the springs tributary thereto, from
Smithfield Irrigation Company, and obtained none
from defendants or their )predecessors in inte:est.

It is generally held that prohibitory provisions
such as the one quoted above, are self-executing,
and that an act done in violation: of these provisions
is void.
11 Am. Jr. at Page 695, Note 13; 12
C. J. 731, Note 63.
Being a creature of statute, a municipal corporation possesses such power, and such power
only, as the State confers upon it. Subject at all
tllnes to constitutional limitations, the legislature
n1ay confer upon such corporations ·such power as
it sees fit.
43 C.J. 176.
Municipal corporations are subject to the limitations of both State and Federal Constitutions.
43 C.J. 225.

Parties contracting with a municipality must
take notice of its powers. If it goes beyond its
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po~·ers,

·the parties so contracting, do so at their

peril.
Cobb v. City, 179 Okla. 126; 64 Pac. (2d)
901.
Ryan v. Thomast(Arizona) 53 Pac (2d)
863. !
Utah Rapid Trrursit Co. v. Ogden City,
89 U. 546 ; 58 Pac. ( 2d) 1. ·
News Etc. v. Carbon County (Utah) 72
Utah 88; 269 Pac. 129.
On the question of the effect of .acquiesence
in a given situation, or fin the performance of an
agreement, over a long p,eriod of time, see:
San Francisco v. Itsell. 80 Cal. 57; 22

Pa.c. 74.
This case was appealed to the ·Supreme Court
of the United State·s and the appeal dismissed; s·ee
10 S.Ct. 24; 133 U.S. 65; 32 L.Ed. 570.

We come now to a ·consideration of the Utah
cases involving sales and exchanges of water by
municipal corporations.
Ogden City v. Bear Lake & River 'Vater
·V\Torks.·& Irrigation Company, 16 Utah
440; 52 Pa.c. 697.
This case came before our Suprem.e Court in
1898, two years after the adoption of the Utah Constitution. It involved a controversy and a ·consideration of questions ateda.ting the adoption of the
Constitution; hence, the prohibitory provi·sion was
not referred to in the opinion. The case simply
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held that the provisions of the charter of a. city
must be strictly construed. Provisions authorizing the city to lease, convey, and dispose of prop,~l1y, botli real and personal, for the benefit of the
city, the case held, did not authorize the city to
lea'Se or otherwise transfer its "~aterworks system,
or: its water right used in supplJing its inhabitants
with water, and that in ord-er to authorize such a
sale or transfer the charter would, of neeessity,
hav-e to ·specifically authorize that specific act.

State Ex rei Ellerbeck v. Salt Lake 'City,
29 Utah 361; Sl Pac. 273.
This case was decided on June 24, 1905. It
involved the application for a writ of prohibition
restraining Salt Lake City and its officers from issuing, negotiating or selling certain municipal bonds
i:;;sued by the city for the purpose, among other
things, of procuring a permanent and adequate increase in tlie water supply of the city. The munipality had entered into an agreement with certain
farmers for the exchange of its Utah Lake R~eser
voir water for mountain water which could be used
for culinary purposes. It wa·s contended that the
exchange wa:s not valid, because of the fact that the
irrigation water was greater in quantity than the
mountain water which the city received in exchange
therefor.
The Court had before it the quc;stion of exchange referred to in the Utah Constitution. It
held that the exchange was valid, even though there
was a disparity in the quantity, the value of the
·water being equated by the superior quality of that
received frotn the farmers. This case ·simply con~ trues a provision of the Constitution ,vhich in and
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of itself is clear and, it would seem, needs no judicial construction.
Brummit v. Water Works Co. 33 Utah 285;
93 Pac. 829.
This case was decided on February 2, 1908~
::1nd had to do with the contract_ involved in the case
of Ogden City v. Bear Lake & River'·Water Works
& Irrigation Company, ·supra. So far as its application to the facts of the instant cas.e are concerned
the syllabus (17) reflects the holding of the Court.
It reads:
'' W at.ers - Public Water Supply- Right
of City to Dispose of· ·Water RightsConstitutional Provisions - Constitution,
Art. 11, Section 6, provides that no municipal corporation· shall directly or indirectly lease any water rights or ·sources of
wa.ter supply controlled by' it, but all such
rights, etc. shall be preserved, maintained
and operated by it for supplying its inhabitants with water at rea:sonable charges;
provided that nothing herein contained
shall he construed to prevent an exchange
of water rights or sources of water supply
for others of .equal value, and to be devoted
in like manner to the public supply of its
inhabitants. Prior to the time the constitution went into effect, a city had made a
contract purporting to lease certain water
rights to 'one who a.gre·ed to construct and
operate a system of waterworks to sup'{)ly
tl1e city, etc., under which: the les·see was to
furnish certain free water to the city.
After the Constitution was ado-pted, the
r.itv pa.s~Prl an ordinance regulating its relations with the companv which succeeded
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to the rights of the le-ssee in ""hich sonte
changes in rate·s, etc.. "·ere n1ade, and this
ordinance granted to the con1pany the use
of the water rights for a tern1 of fifty years
as a part of the arrangement; but the city
was still to receive considerable 'vater for
public purpos-es free of charge.
Held, that the ordinance was in effect a
mere continuance of the former contract,
and the disposition of the city's 'vater
right was valid.''
' This case makes it clear that neither it nor the
·ease of '":Ogden City '· Bear Lake & River Water
\\orks & Irrigation Company, supra, were decided
under the constitutional provision above mentioned:
that both were expressly decided on a state of facts
antedating the enactment of the Constitution.
Genola To~ v. Santaquin City et al. 96
Utah 88; 80 Pac. (2d) 930.
Thi·s Court held that in the Genola ·case there was
an actual exchang-e of water, and the case was susstained on that theory. The Court did not hold that
water rights might be exchanged for other property
such as rights of way.
If there is any doubt a:s to the holding in the
Gtnola case, v."'"e cite the opinion of the Court on the
petition for rehearing. See
Genola Town v. Santaquin, 96 Utah 104;
85 Pac. (2d) 790.
There the Court made it verv clear that it expresslv
held that a municipality m~y not dir·ectly or indirectly sell, alienate or dispose of any of its water
rights, and that it may only exchange some of its
rights ''hen 1t.he value of the use of- the water reeeived i~ ~qual to the value of the use of the water
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with which the city has parted. The ruling on. the
petition for rehearing is short and concise. We
r~spectfully direct the Court's attention to it.
Throughout the proeeedings in the case at bar,
from time to time, counsel for defendants contended
that the plaintiff was estopped to repudiate the
1agreement of 1911 and from seeking refuge behind
the constitutional provision. We refer to the original Genola Town case,
96 Utah 88; 80 Pac. (2d) 930.
In the concluding paragraph the Court deal·s with
the question of estoppel in the following language:
''While in some cases a party may be estopped from taking advantage of the unconstitutionality of an Act ( Tite v. State
Tax Co~ission, 89 Utah 404; 57 Pa.c. (Zd):
734) the· representatives of a municipality
must act within their powers, and the. city
cannot be estopped from declaring its own
acts~ as unconstitutional.''
See to same effect :
Horkan v. City of Moultrie (Ga.) 71 S.E.
785, supra.
Boise City v. Boise, etc. Co., 186 Fed.
- 705, supra..
In the lates~t }yolume of· A1nerican Law Reports (Volume 122 A.L.R. 1370), under an annotation dealing with the right of .a municipality
to enforce a contract which was in ·exces'S of the
municipality's power, we find the following statement of the principle of law under consideration.
We quote the following from pa.ge 1371:
''The doctrine of ultra vires has, with goon
reason, been applied with greater strictnes·s
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to municipal bodies than to priYate corporations; and in general a municipality is not
estopped from denying the validity of a
contract made by its officers, 'vhere ~here
has been no authority for making such a
contract. Thus it is generally held that
when a contract has been entered into by
a municipal corporation 'vith respect to a
subject matter which "ra,s not ""itihn its
corporate powers, the corporation cannot
be held liable on the contract whether or
not the other party thereto ha~ fully carried out lris part of the agreement. This
rule has reference to the liability of the
municipality on its ultra Yires contracts
when sued by the other party to the contract.''

In the Genola case, the Supreme Court exercised its equitable powers to require performance
of a contract which· the Court itself held wa:s a
valid exchange of water rights. The fact that the
Court gave as an added reason for . enforcing the
contract, its disinclination to "make for naught a·
large portion of Genola 's expenditures and delay
the benefits of them,'' is wholly immaterial to thE'
actual holding of the case. Had there been no exrhange of water, would it now be contended that,
because of the -expenditures of Genola, the courts
would still be of a disposition to enforce specific
performa-nce 1 The answer to thi·s is that no court
would enforce a void contract because of any
equitable consideration.

On more than

on~

occasion WP were reminded
hv counsel that thp Town of Hvde P.ark was enc1Pavorin!!' to evad~ the nBrform.flnce of ~n agreelnent solemnlv enter0.(1 into in 1q1J ann which. for
a numbP.r of years, wa.s faithfully carried out.
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Such reminder is wholly be·side the point. If, In
fact, the Town was, under the express provisions
of the Constitution, prohibited from selling to
defendants a portion of its water ·supp~ly, we are
unable to see why it must forev:er .act unlawfully
and continue to carry out the terms of the invalid
agreement, even though it had done s.o .for a num.
her of years.
The defendants, as a matter of law, must be
held to have. had knowledge that the execution of
the agreement wa·s not .within the powers of the
Town. They· had no right to expect tha1t it would
forever he carried out. On the contrary they must
have a.ssumed tha.t at sometime the officers of the
municipality would do their duty and repudiate th.P
invalid agreement.
Neither can it avail defendants anything to say
Jhat the quantity of water claimed by them constituted but. a .very small porlion of Hyde Park's
•supply. If the Town had the right to s·ell a small
stream, it also had the right to sell a larger one.
rrhe question of quantity cannot influence the case
:one way or the other. This was made clear in the
Genola case, ·supra. On page 935 of the original
opinion, ! 80 Pacific ( 2d) 930, the court recogmized
the right of a city to sell its surplus water, even to
outsiders, provi,ded the sale "ras made in the same
manner that it sells water to its own inhabitants,
and provided also that 'the sale was not made in
'perpetuity. lJnder the prohibition found in the
(~onstitution, the court sa,id a municipality was not
permitted to alienate its water even though the
alienee "'"'as another worthy community or person,
such, as it 'Yill br contended, and such as we are
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willing to admit, the defendants are in the instant
taSe. \\~e quote the follo,ving language:
••.A city may sell its excess wat€r to outsiders. Such is not a sale of its water
sources or water rights but "·ater fron1 its
'System in the manner it sells to its citiz·en~.
But may it obligate itself to deliver a definite amount in perpetuityf \Ye think·thi~
agreement is, in effect, a parting with its
water right pro tanto. \\ e see no real dif~
ference in parting with a water right which
yields 100 gallons per minute by transfer
and obligating one's self to deliver from
a water right 100 gallons per minute in
perpetuity. Sec . 6, ~-\rt. 11, should not be
narrowly or strictly construed. It was
meant to secure to communities their "\Yater
systems and prohibit any sale or lea·se to
private parties. This ig one project which
the Constitution decreed should be kept in
social ownership by the community. ·Where
another town or community needing 'vater
would be the beneficiary of a total or partial alienation of water rights or sources.
especially where the g-ranting community
had an excess supply was perhaps not really
jntended to be prohibited, yet- the language
is definite that it shall not be aliena.ted
and does not exclude the case where the
alienee is another worthy communjty. We
see no escape, therefore, from the proposition that under the a~eement th~ City ".,.ag,
in effect, par6ng' pro tanto with its water
rights.''
The Genola case wa~s decided on the rlefinite
proposition that the ag-reement between the two
towns involved an exchange of water. This brought
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it within the exception contained in the constitutional provision.
In conclusion, we wish to make one specific
reference to kssignment of Error No. 19 in the
instant case. Paragraph two of the decree, after
naming
the defendants, contains the following
.
.
prOVISIOn:
'' . . . . are each entitled to the use of a
tap connected with the plaintiff's pipe-line
to supply the sai·d defendants and their
·successors in interest with sufficient culinary water for human consumption and
stock-watering purposes for the same number of domestic animals heretofore · habitually kept on said respective premise's, the
said human consumption from each of said
taps to not exceed 300 gallons per tap per
day.''
This provision i·s too indefinite to be perfonned. There are no human beings residing on
either of said lands. No water is used except in
the summer. Why should the court ·say not to exceed "300 gallons'' for this useT No attempt was
made to fix the number of cattle nor the amount
they would require. Such a odecree is too indefinite
to stand.
33 c. J. 1103.
Hand v. ·Twin Faits County, 40 Idaho 638,
236 Pac. 936.
Sharp v. ·Whitmore, 51 U. 14, 168 P. 273.
Herdy v. Beaver County Irr. Co., 65 U. 28,
234 P. 524.
Respectfully submitted
YOUNG & BIDJLEN, AND
lR.VINE, SKEEN, THURMAN & MINER
Attorneys for Appellant.
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